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Background: While models of autism spectrum conditions (ASC) are emerging at the genetic level of analysis, clear
models at higher levels of analysis, such as neuroanatomy, are lacking. Here we examine agenesis of the corpus
callosum (AgCC) as a model at the level of neuroanatomy that may be relevant for understanding self-referential
and social-cognitive difficulties in ASC.
Methods: We examined performance on a wide array of tests in self-referential and social-cognitive domains in a
patient with both AgCC and a diagnosis of ASC. Tests included a depth-of-processing memory paradigm with
self-referential and social-cognitive manipulations, self-report measures of self-consciousness, alexithymia, and
empathy, as well as performance measures of first-person pronoun usage and mentalizing ability. The performance
of the AgCC patient was compared to a group of individuals with ASC but without AgCC and with neurotypical
controls. These comparison groups come from a prior study where group differences were apparent across many
measures. We used bootstrapping to assess whether the AgCC patient exhibited scores that were within or outside
the 95% bias-corrected and accelerated bootstrap confidence intervals observed in both comparison groups.
Results: Within the depth-of-processing memory paradigm, the AgCC patient showed decreased memory
sensitivity that was more extreme than both comparison groups across all conditions. The patient’s most
pronounced difficulty on this task emerged in the social-cognitive domain related to information-processing about
other people. The patient was similar to the ASC group in benefiting less from self-referential processing compared
to the control group. Across a variety of other self-referential (i.e. alexithymia, private self-consciousness) and
social-cognitive measures (i.e. self-reported imaginative and perspective-taking subscales of empathy, mentalizing),
the AgCC patient also showed more extreme scores than those observed for both of the comparison groups.
However, the AgCC patient scored within the range observed in the comparison groups on measures of
first-person pronoun usage and self-reported affective empathy subscales.
Conclusions: We conclude that AgCC co-occurring with a diagnosis of ASC may be a relevant model at the level
of neuroanatomy for understanding mechanisms involved in self-referential and high-level social-cognitive
difficulties in ASC.
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Autism is a neurodevelopmental condition characterized
by marked impairments in the domains of social inter-
action, language/communication, and pronounced repeti-
tive stereotyped behaviors and/or restricted interests. The
etiology of autism is complex as many genetic syndromes
characterized by single-gene mutations (e.g., fragile X
syndrome, Rett syndrome, tuberous sclerosis, Timothy
syndrome) can result in a phenotype that meets the diag-
nostic criteria of autism (i.e. ‘syndromic autism’) [1]. Fur-
thermore, research on non-syndromic forms of autism
show that many simplex cases (up to 10% to 20%, but
possibly more) possess de novo mutations in segments of
DNA (i.e. deletions and/or duplications) presented as
copy number variations [2-4]. This has resulted in the
idea that there may be many types of autism arising from
a complex combination of many different mechanisms.
In order to decompose some of this complexity, there is
a need for clear models at a variety of levels of analysis.
Autism genetics has already provided several useful mod-
els for understanding how genetic mechanisms linked to
autism may have pathophysiological impact [5-8]. How-
ever, we currently lack clear models at higher levels of
analysis such as at the level of neuroanatomy. In this
paper, we focus on agenesis of the corpus callosum as
one model at the level of neuroanatomy for dissecting
aspects of self-referential and social-cognitive difficulties
in autism. More specifically, we focus on areas within
the self-referential domain related to the cognitive bene-
fits of self-referential information processing (i.e. the
self-reference effect in memory) as well as difficulties in
emotional awareness (i.e. alexithymia), which are known
to be more pronounced in higher-functioning adults with
ASC. Within the social-cognitive domain, we focus on
higher-level social-cognitive understanding of others (i.e.
mentalizing, empathy), as well as memory for social
agents; each of which have been shown to be sensitive to
deficits in higher-functioning adults with ASC.
Agenesis of the corpus callosum (AgCC) is a congeni-
tal condition manifested in the failure to completely de-
velop a corpus callosum; the largest white matter tract
connecting the two cerebral hemispheres [9,10]. AgCC
can present as a complete or partial absence of the CC.
Complex AgCC occurs with the presence of other con-
founding brain abnormalities such as polymicrogyria,
heterotopia, or schizencephaly, whereas isolated AgCC
does not occur with such abnormalities. However, iso-
lated AgCC commonly co-occurs with colpocephaly
(i.e. dilation of the posterior section of the lateral ven-
tricles and reduction of ipsilateral cortical association
tracts) and Probst bundles [10]. The etiologies of AgCC
are complex and likely reflect a multitude of routes import-
ant for fully establishing callosal connections (i.e. cellular
proliferation and migration, axon guidance and growth,glial development, and midline patterning). Many genetic
syndromes are associated with AgCC (e.g., X-linked lissen-
cephaly, Mowat-Wilson syndrome, CRASH syndrome),
and some of these syndromes have been associated with
autism (i.e. ARX mutations leading to X-linked lissen-
cephaly [11]). However, like autism, the majority of
AgCC cases do not have an identifiable single genetic
cause [10]. There are important clinical and neuroana-
tomical parallels between AgCC and autism that may
suggest the role of atypical callosal development in
understanding the emergence of phenotypes associated
with autism.
First, one of the more replicable findings in neurosci-
ence research on autism is marked atypicalities in the
corpus callosum (CC). In a meta-analysis of volumetric
MRI studies on the CC in autism, Frazier and Hardan
[12] found that all subsections are consistently observed
as reduced in volume. This result is further bolstered by
longitudinal evidence for persistence of CC volumetric
reduction at a 2-year follow-up examination [13]. In dif-
fusion MRI work, several atypicalities in CC integrity,
particularly with respect to reduced fractional anisotropy
and increased mean diffusivity are reported [14-20]. Fi-
nally, a recent study using magnetization transfer im-
aging as an index of processes relevant to myelination
found evidence for atypical myelination of the CC in
autism [21]. The mounting evidence for atypical CC de-
velopment in autism, particularly with respect to
reduced size, potentially indicates that mechanisms
involved in AgCC may also be important in autism.
Second, there are important clinical aspects that over-
lap between AgCC and autism. One of the most well
known cases of such overlap is the case of the real
‘Rainman’, Kim Peek, who was diagnosed with autism
well before later MRI scans determined he also had
complete AgCC. Approximately 3% to 5% of individuals
with neurodevelopmental conditions also have AgCC or
CC hypoplasia [22,23], and this is of particular relevance
for autism, where CC volume is notably reduced [12]. In
addition, 8.5% of individuals with AgCC also have a spe-
cific diagnosis of autism [24]. However, this estimate
may be conservative [9,25]. Badaruddin et al. [26]
reported that in a sample of 61 two- to eleven-year-old
children with AgCC, as many as 34% met criteria for at
least one item in the domain of social impairment, 25%
met criteria for at least one item in the communicative
domain (with 51% showing difficulty in sustaining con-
versation), and up to 28% had a preoccupation with a
specific interest. More recently, in 106 patients with
AgCC, Lau et al. [27] found that 43% of children, 35% of
adolescents, and 18% of adults score above cut-offs on
the Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ) that are typically
used for screening for clinical diagnoses of autism
spectrum conditions (ASCs).
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psychological profile of AgCC are impairments in self-
referential and social cognition [10]. Within the social-
cognitive domain, many atypical findings in AgCC
overlap with those seen in autism. Theory of mind or
mentalizing impairments have long been known in aut-
ism [28,29], and these impairments can be helpful for
explaining difficulties in pragmatic aspects of social
communication [30]. Deficits in cognitive aspects of em-
pathy [31-33] and on self-report measures of empathy
[34-38] have been consistently reported in ASC.
Affective components of empathy are spared in ASC
[31,33], although self-report measures of this component
are somewhat inconsistent. Some studies show decreases
on subscales such as empathic concern [35,39] but
increases on subscales such as personal distress [35].
The latter subscale is likely linked to comorbid anxiety
traits in ASC [40]. Still other reports of self-reported
affective empathy show no differences [36,38]. Given dif-
ficulties in ASC with self-referential cognitive proces-
sing, it is likely that the experimental studies on the
topic comparing ASC to other groups with dissociable
empathy deficits, such as individuals with psychopathic
tendencies or conduct disorder [31,33], give the clearest
indication of the empathy profile in ASC rather than
relying solely on self-report measures.
Several studies now show that individuals with AgCC
have marked impairments in pragmatic aspects of lan-
guage processing, including comprehension of idioms,
proverbs, vocal prosody, and non-literal interpretation
of humorous statements [41-44]. Outside of pragmatic
social communication difficulties, AgCC also shares
social-cognitive deficits with those seen in autism. These
difficulties extend into difficulty providing narratives that
demonstrate understanding of social-emotional aspects
of stories [45-47]. There are mixed reports regarding
AgCC and ToM deficits. One study found deficits on
the Reading the Mind in the Eyes test in some, but not
all, AgCC patients [25]. However, other work on adoles-
cents and adult patients did not reveal deficits on other
advanced ToM stories and faux pas tests [48] known to
be sensitive to deficits within autism [49,50]. While
Symington et al. [48] did not find such advanced ToM
deficits, they found difficulties in AgCC when asked to
interpret videotaped social vignettes which indicated
subtle deficits in emotion recognition, understanding
sarcasm, and difficulty interpreting textual cues [48]. Fi-
nally, AgCC patients tend to underestimate emotional
valence and intensity from negatively valenced pictures
[51]. However, no studies exist in AgCC that compre-
hensively test components of empathy, making compari-
son with ASC difficult.
Prior work in the domain of self-referential cognition
also indicates that difficulties in autism [35,52-54] maybe shared by patients with AgCC. First, individuals with
ASC show deficits across a wide range of areas where
self-relevant information processing is critical, such as
emotional understanding (e.g., alexithymia) [55], mem-
ory [35,56], introspection [57], pronoun usage [35,58],
orienting to name [59,60], monitoring own intentions
[61], remembering own false beliefs [62], attributing pri-
vileged access to self over close others [63] (for review
see [52,53,56,58,64,65]). Within AgCC, one case study
highlighted the possibility that alexithymia may be more
pronounced [66]. This observation is similar to other
reports on alexithymia hypothesizing that one aspect of
its neurophysiological basis is reduced interhemispheric
transfer [66-69]. Parental reports indicate that patients
with AgCC show poor personal insight [10]. Also indica-
tive of a potential lack of insight is the effect that paren-
tal ratings tend to be higher than self-reported ratings
on the AQ [27]. Analysis of narrative content indicates
that patients with AgCC tend to use more first-person
pronouns than comparison groups [46]. Finally, Brown
and Paul [70] suggest that high scores on the Minnesota
Multiphasic Personality Inventory Lie scale (without ele-
vations in other scales) may be indicative of poor self-
awareness in the two AgCC cases they tested.
Despite the evidence reviewed here with regard to self-
referential and social cognition, much work is still
needed. At present, very few studies on AgCC exist
(e.g., [48]) that assess social-cognitive abilities known to
be clearly atypical in autism. In addition, even less re-
search in AgCC specifically tests known self-referential
atypicalities in autism. In this study, we add to this litera-
ture by using a battery that measures processes such as
empathy, mentalizing, alexithymia, self-referential memory
biases, private self-consciousness, and implicit self-focused
attention. We also attempt to go further by assessing a
case with both partial AgCC and autism in comparison to
both neurotypical controls and cases of autism without
AgCC. By comparing this single case to the two groups,
we examined the extent to which aspects of his self-
referential and social-cognitive profile overlap with the
pattern found in autism and also identified aspects which
may be even more atypical than those seen in autism.
From the viewpoint that individuals with autism typically
have smaller CCs than controls, AgCC could be construed
as an extreme of this profile. Therefore, highlighting areas
in AgCC that are even more extreme compared to the aut-
ism group may provide some indication that the CC is




The patient reported in this study has diagnoses of
partial AgCC and Asperger syndrome (AS) and will be
Figure 1 Structural MRI scan of patient AG. AG has partial
agenesis of the corpus callosum (AgCC) and a clinical diagnosis of
an autism spectrum condition (ASC). AG also showed signs of
colpocephaly; dilation of the posterior aspect of the lateral ventricles.
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ticipant of a larger multi-centre MRI study of ASC: the
MRC AIMS Consortium study [54,71-78]. AG gave
informed consent for the study in accordance with ethics
approval from the National Research Ethics Committee,
Suffolk, England. Upon AG’s recruitment, we considered
him as having only a clinical diagnosis of AS, but later
his AgCC was incidentally found by neuroradiological
examination of his brain structural MRI scans. In keep-
ing with the MRC AIMS protocol, both the Autism
Diagnostic Interview–Revised (ADI–R) and the Autism
Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS) were con-
ducted before MRI scanning to confirm clinical diagno-
sis of ASC. AG scored above the cut-offs on both the
ADI–R and ADOS (see Table 1 for scores and demo-
graphic information). In accordance with the recruit-
ment criteria for the MRC AIMS Consortium, AG did
not have any other comorbid medical (e.g., epilepsy) or
neuropsychiatric conditions (e.g., attention-deficit/hyper-
activity disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder). AG’s
level of adaptive functioning was not rigorously assessed
with any standardized measures, but parental report
indicated limited living independence (i.e. living with
parents, no full-time employment).
After completing the MRI scan (see Figure 1), it was
immediately apparent that AG lacked almost all of the
CC. A partial segment of the CC was intact in the pos-
ition of what would typically be the splenium and/or
isthmus. However, given the variability in positioning
and connectivity of partial segments of the CC in partial
AgCC, we cannot say with certainty that the splenium/
isthmus was the subsection that was intact [79]. The an-
terior commissure was visible and intact. However,
Probst bundles were visibly emanating in an anterior dir-
ection from the intact section of the CC. There were
also signs of colpocephaly (i.e. dilation of the posteriorTable 1 Participant characteristicsa
Control ASC AG
N (Sex) 30 (23 M, 7 F) 30 (23 M, 7 F) 1 (M)
Age 29.93 (7.83) 29.13 (7.40) 29
VIQ 116.47 (8.65) 116.13 (12.81) 87
PIQ 114.43 (10.08) 114.17 (14.21) 87
FIQ 117.10 (8.65) 117.23 (13.11) 85
AQ 16.50 (6.38) 33.93 (7.89) 36
ADOS Comm-Soc - - 7
ADI-Social - - 22
ADI-Comm - - 12
ADI-Rep - - 10
aMean and standard deviations (in parentheses) are given for the control and ASC
groups. AG’s performance is given in the third column. ADOS and ADI scores reflect
diagnostic algorithm scores. ASC, autism spectrum condition; VIQ, verbal IQ; PIQ,
performance IQ; FIQ, full-scale IQ; ADOS, Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule;
ADI, Autism Diagnostic Interview; Comm, communication.aspect of the lateral ventricles.) There were no signs of
polymicrogyria or heterotopic sigmoid bundles connect-
ing occipital and frontal cortex. An independent radiolo-
gist confirmed these observations and converged upon
the same diagnosis. AG’s general practitioner was
informed immediately in accordance with standard oper-
ating procedures for incidental MRI findings.Comparison groups
In order to assess self-referential and social cognition in
AG, we used the same battery of tests reported in our
previous paper on autism [35]. In that paper, we found
across a variety of different measures a robust pattern of
co-existing deficits in autism within the domains of self-
referential and social-cognitive processing. Because we
wanted to compare AG’s presentation to these patterns
in autism, the control and ASC groups from this previ-
ous study [35] were used to provide comparison data to
AG. All control and ASC participants in the prior study
gave informed consent in accordance with ethics ap-
proval from the University of Cambridge Psychology Re-
search Ethics Committee. There were 23 males and 7
females ages 19 to 45 years who had a formal diagnosis
based on DSM-IV or ICD-10 criteria of either high-
functioning autism (HFA; n = 4) or AS (n = 26). Con-
trols consisted of 23 males and 7 females who were
pairwise-matched with the ASC participants on age and
sex and had no known psychiatric, developmental, or
neurological disorders. All participants completed the
AQ [80], and the ASC group scored higher than controls
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range on the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence
(WASI) [81], and there were no statistically significant
group differences on verbal, performance, or full-scale IQ
(all P > 0.90). See Table 1 for participant characteristics.
Procedure and measures
Self-reference effect in memory (SRE) paradigm
The main experimental paradigm for testing both self-
referential and social-cognitive information processing
was the self-reference effect in memory paradigm (SRE).
This paradigm allows participants to encode trait adjec-
tives by judging them in relation to how descriptive they
are of themselves or other people. Other encoding
manipulations in this paradigm might involve semantic
encoding manipulations or judgments based on basic
linguistic characteristics. After encoding, participants are
given a surprise memory test, and the typical trend is for
heightened memory sensitivity for information previ-
ously encoded in relation to oneself when compared to
other encoding conditions (i.e. thinking about others, se-
mantic manipulations, linguistic characteristics). There
is generally a gradient in memory performance across
this paradigm, with the best memory for self-relevant in-
formation, followed by memory for others, semantic
manipulations, and worst memory for shallow encoding
based on basic linguistic characteristics. The SRE para-
digm is a ‘depth-of-processing’ paradigm [82] because it
is thought that the ‘deepest’ level of encoding in memory
tends to be around structures that can easily organize
and elaborate on information and the self possesses such
properties that allow for deep organization and elabor-
ation of information [83-85].
For the current study, in the encoding phase, partici-
pants judged trait adjectives in one of four ways. In the
‘self ’ condition, participants judged how descriptive the
adjective was of themselves. In the ‘similar close other’
condition, adjectives were judged on how descriptive
they were of their best friend. In the ‘dissimilar non-
close other’ condition, participants judged whether the
adjective was descriptive of Harry Potter [86]. All of
these judgments were made on a 6-point scale, where 1
indicated ‘not at all descriptive’ and 6 indicated ‘very de-
scriptive’. Finally, in the non-social control condition,
participants judged how many syllables each adjective
contained (from 1 to 6).
Each condition had 30 trials, and all were presented in
pseudorandom order. All adjectives were drawn from a
previously validated and widely used set of trait adjec-
tives [87]. Half the adjectives in each condition were
positively valenced (e.g., inventive), and the other half
were negatively valenced (e.g., messy). Among all condi-
tions, there were no differences in the number of charac-
ters, syllables, valence, or frequency of the adjectives.After encoding, there was a 30-minute delay before the
retrieval phase. Participants were completely unaware of
the subsequent recognition memory task to follow. Dur-
ing this delay, participants completed the performance
section of the WASI. These tasks were nonverbal and
were administered to keep the participant occupied dur-
ing the delay period.
After the delay, participants were given a surprise rec-
ognition memory test. All 120 adjectives from encoding
and 120 new distracter adjectives were presented in
pseudorandom order. Participants judged their confi-
dence in whether the adjective was ‘old’ or ‘new’. Confi-
dence judgments were made on a 1 to 6 scale, where 6
was ‘definitely OLD’ and 4 was ‘OLD, but kind of un-
sure’. Conversely, a 1 indicated that they were ‘definitely
NEW’ and 3 was ‘NEW, but kind of unsure’. This 6-
point scale was used to force participants to make finer-
grained recognition judgments and also to investigate
whether there were any differences in how each group
used different confidence judgments. Because there were
no group differences among judgments on each scale
point within any of the conditions, we collapsed judg-
ments 1 through 3 into ‘New” and 4 through 6 into ‘old’
judgments. Furthermore, because all of the data from
the control and ASC comparison groups come from a
previously published report, we refer to that paper for
details on the manipulation checks to ensure that parti-
cipants did perceive best friends as more similar and
closer to self than Harry Potter (see Manipulation Check
section [35]). Finally, the dependent variable from this
paradigm was a standard measure of memory sensitivity
(d0), formulated as the standardized score of correctly
remembered words minus the standardized score of false
alarms. Higher d0 scores indicate enhanced memory
sensitivity.
Additional self-referential and social-cognitive measures
In addition to the SRE paradigm, we included three
other measures in the domain of self-referential cogni-
tion. These measures are included as a supplement to
the self-referential memory sensitivity measure from the
SRE paradigm and because they are theoretically rele-
vant measures for testing more generalized deficits in
self-referential processing in ASC [35]. If self-referential
processing is atypical, then we expect to observe atypical
performance across these additional measures as well as
on the self-condition from the SRE paradigm. Self-report
measures such as the Private Self-Consciousness Scale
(PSCS) [88] and the Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS)
[89] were used to measure explicit self-focused attention
and emotional awareness. The TAS was further split into
difficulty identifying feelings (DIF), difficulty describing
feelings (DDF), and externally oriented thinking (EOT)
subscales. On the TAS and all its subscales, higher
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preted as more impaired. We also included a perform-
ance measure of implicit self-focused attention called
the Self-Focus Sentence Completion task [90]. In this
task, participants were given sentence stems that
included a self-reference (e.g., “I think. . .,” or “If I had
my way. . .”). For each stem, we asked participants to
complete the sentence in whatever way they liked.
We computed an index of implicit self-focused at-
tention (SFA) by automatically computing the per-
centage of first-person pronouns used to complete
the stems (e.g., I, me, myself ) using the Linguistic
Inquiry and Word Count program [91]. This index
has been used previously as a quantitative index of
SFA [92-94]. Higher scores on this index indicate
more implicit self-focused attention.
In addition to the two ‘other’ conditions within the
SRE paradigm, we included further measures in the do-
main of ‘other-oriented’ social-cognitive processing.
Again, similar to the rationale behind the additional self-
referential measures, these measures were included as a
supplement to the social-cognitive memory sensitivity
measures observed on the SRE paradigm and because
they are theoretically relevant measures for testing more
generalized deficits in social-cognitive processing in ASC
[35]. If social-cognitive processing is atypical, then we
expect to observe atypical performance across these add-
itional measures as well as on the Friend and Potter con-
ditions of the SRE paradigm. Three self-report measures
of empathy were used: the Empathy Quotient (EQ) [34],
the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) [95], and the
Emotional Contagion Scale (ECS) [96]. The IRI was fur-
ther split into perspective-taking (IRI-PT), empathic
concern (IRI-EC), fantasy (IRI-FS), and personal distress
(IRI-PD) subscales. Finally, we included the ‘Reading the
Mind in the Eyes’ test (RMET) as one advanced per-
formance measure of mentalizing/theory of mind [32].
Statistical analyses
To estimate similarities and differences between AG and
the control and ASC comparison groups, bootstrapping
(1 million resamples) [97] was used to estimate bias-
corrected and accelerated 95% confidence intervals
around the mean statistic from the control and ASC
groups. AG’s performance was then compared to these
bootstrap distributions. If AG’s performance was outside
the bootstrap confidence intervals, we inferred that AG’s
performance was significantly more extreme than per-
formance on average within the comparison group.
Because AG had IQ scores below the comparison
groups, further correlation analyses were run on the
ASC group only (the one comparison group that par-
tially overlaps with AG’s clinical presentation of ASC) in
order to examine whether IQ, particularly verbal IQ(VIQ), was related to any of the dependent variables. For
these analyses, we used robust regression [98] to esti-
mate correlations with IQ that are robust to the influ-
ence of outlying data points.
Results
Table 1 shows participant characteristics for patient AG
and the comparison groups. AG was similar to the mean
ages of the two comparison groups. On IQ scales, AG
was approximately 2 standard deviations below the mean
of the comparison groups. Given the IQ differences, for
all further analyses, we ran robust regression within the
ASC group to assess the correlation between VIQ and
the dependent measures while being insensitive to out-
liers. Any significant correlations within the ASC group
would signal potentially that AG’s performance might be
influenced by lower IQ than the comparison groups.
On the SRE paradigm, AG’s performance was signifi-
cantly worse than both the ASC and control groups
on all conditions, as noted by performance below the
lower-bound 95% bootstrap confidence interval. The
conditions with the largest deficits in performance
were in social-cognitive conditions (Friend and Potter),
whereas more subtle deficits were apparent across Self
and Syllable conditions (see Figure 2 and Table 2). These
results could not easily be explained simply by general-
ized slowed speed of processing in AgCC [99], because
our patient responded with speed similar to, or in some
cases faster than, both comparison groups across encod-
ing and retrieval phases (see Additional file 1: Figure
S1). Correlations between VIQ and memory sensitivity
were assessed next to ascertain if AG’s performance
might be explained by correlation between IQ and mem-
ory sensitivity in the ASC group. Here we found that
correlations were positive for all conditions and were
nominally significant (i.e. P < 0.05 but did not survive
corrections for multiple comparisons) for VIQ in rela-
tion to Friend (r = 0.51, P = 0.0134) and Potter (r = 0.45,
P = 0.0268) conditions (see Additional file 1: Figure S2).
This potentially suggests that worse memory perform-
ance in AG can be partially explained by an IQ lower
than the IQs in the comparison groups.
Next we computed measures of the self-reference
effect in memory, which is operationalized as the
difference-score between memory sensitivity for self-
and other non-self-encoding conditions (see Figure 3)
[35,83]. On this measure, an increasingly positive value
means larger cognitive benefits for self-referential infor-
mation processing. Given the descriptive statistics in
Table 1, it is not surprising that we found that AgCC
had an enhanced SRE difference-score compared to both
the ASC and control groups for Self-Friend. However,
this difference is driven primarily by the large drop-off

































Figure 2 Self-reference effect in memory (SRE) data. This figure plots the bootstrap distributions of the mean along with the 95%
bias-corrected and accelerated bootstrap confidence intervals (vertical dotted lines). The ASC group is depicted in red and the control group in
blue. AG is depicted as the black dotted line. Abbreviations: d0, memory sensitivity; ASC, autism spectrum condition; AgCC, agenesis of the
corpus callosum.
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and ASC groups). Given that the ASC and AgCC groups
are predicted to have social-cognitive deficits, the social-
cognitive conditions are not the best for using in such
difference-scores as an assessment of whether one bene-
fits from self-referential information processing. The
reason here is that deficits in the social-cognitive domain
can affect the difference-score, and, rather than it saying
something about self-referential processing, it has more
to say about social-cognitive deficits. Therefore, the Self-
Friend and Self-Potter difference-scores do not provide
an unambiguous measure of whether AG benefits from
self-referential information processing.Table 2 Self-reference effect in memory (SRE) paradigma
Control ASC AG
d0 Self 1.68 (1.50 to 1.85) 1.38 (1.20 to 1.56) 1.19
d0 Friend 1.44 (1.30 to 1.59) 1.14 (0.99 to 1.29) 0.67
d0 Potter 1.02 (0.85 to 1.20) 0.93 (0.77 to 1.10) 0.57
d0 Syllable 0.62 (0.49 to 0.79) 0.61 (0.47 to 0.78) 0.46
aMean and 95% bootstrap bias-corrected and accelerated confidence intervals
(in parentheses) are given for the control and ASC groups. AG’s performance is
given in the third column. In each condition, AG’s performance was below the
lower bound 95% confidence interval for both control and ASC groups. ASC,
autism spectrum condition; d0, index of memory sensitivity.In contrast, the interpretation behind the Self-Syllable
measure is different. Here the difference-score is not
contaminated with effects due to both self-referential
and social-cognitive processing and allows for a more
unambiguous look at whether AG benefits from self-
referential processing. AG shows relatively similar mem-
ory sensitivity for the Syllable-condition (see Table 1 and
Figure 2) but more pronounced dropoff in the Self-
condition, particularly with respect to the control group.
Therefore, the Self-Syllable difference-score shows a
smaller self-reference effect in memory for AG com-
pared to the control group, but similar effect compared
to the ASC group. This effect can be more unambigu-
ously interpreted as a deficit for AG in cognitive benefits
obtained from self-referential information processing be-
cause it is primarily driven by a dropoff in AG’s memory
sensitivity for the Self-condition. This deficit is one that
AG shares with the ASC group, but he cannot be con-
sidered an extreme of the ASC group.
On additional self-referential measures, AG’s perform-
ance was also significantly worse on the TAS and all its
subscales and reported less private self-consciousness on
the PSCS. However, on the SFA measure, AG used sig-

























Figure 3 Self-reference effect in memory difference-score measures. This figure plots the bootstrap distributions of the mean
difference-score of memory sensitivity measures on the SRE paradigm along with the 95% bias-corrected and accelerated bootstrap confidence
intervals (vertical dotted lines). The top panel represents the self-reference effect in memory when Self-memory sensitivity is compared
to Friend-memory sensitivity. The middle panel represents the self-reference effect in memory when Self-memory sensitivity is compared to
Potter-memory sensitivity. The bottom panel represents the self-reference effect in memory when Self-memory sensitivity is compared to
Syllable-memory sensitivity. The ASC group is depicted in red and the control group in blue. AG is depicted as the black dotted line.
Abbreviations: d0, memory sensitivity; ASC, autism spectrum condition; AgCC, agenesis of the corpus callosum.
Lombardo et al. Molecular Autism 2012, 3:14 Page 8 of 15
http://www.molecularautism.com/content/3/1/14group but was similar to the control group. Thus, his
performance on this test is not in keeping with the
slightly lower production of first-person pronouns
observed in the ASC group. See Figure 4 and Table 3.
Correlational analysis showed that IQ was not signifi-
cantly correlated with scores on these additional self-
referential measures (see Additional file 1: Figure S2).
This suggests that extreme scores observed in AG can-
not be explained simply by lower IQ in AG.
On additional social-cognitive measures, AG endorsed
lower levels of empathy on the EQ and lower scores on
the IRI perspective-taking and fantasy subscales com-
pared to Control and ASC groups. AG also performed
more poorly on the RMET task than both groups. In
contrast, on the ECS and IRI-EC, AG self-reported sig-
nificantly higher scores than the ASC group, but was
within the confidence intervals for the control group.
For IRI-PD, AG’s score was within the confidence inter-
vals for the ASC group. See Figures 5 and 6 and Table 4.
Correlational analysis showed that VIQ was not signifi-
cantly correlated with any of these additional social-
cognitive measures except the RMET. On the RMET,VIQ positively correlated with performance (r = 0.5988,
P = 0.001) (see Additional file 1: Figure S2). This sug-
gests that extreme performance on the RMET by AG
could be partially explained by lower IQ. However, IQ
could not explain extreme scores observed on other
measures.
Discussion
In this study, we examined a patient with diagnoses
of both ASC and AgCC on a range of self-referential
and social-cognitive measures known to be atypical in
ASC. As a potential neuroanatomical model for ASC,
we followed the idea that AgCC might be a potential
extreme of smaller CC volume consistently observed
in ASC [12]. Thus, within social-cognitive and self-
referential domains where there is some prior work
showing potential abnormalities in both ASC and AgCC
[10,35,48,52-54,66,70], we tested the idea that if the CC
is critical in these domains, this patient with AgCC and
ASC would show more extreme performance than that
observed in both the ASC and control comparison





















































Figure 4 Additional self-referential measures. This figure plots the bootstrap distributions of the mean along with the 95% bias-corrected and
accelerated bootstrap confidence intervals (vertical dotted lines). The ASC group is depicted in red and the control group in blue. AG is depicted
as the black dotted line. Abbreviations: PSCS, Private Self-Consciousness Scale; SFA, self-focused attention index measured as the percentage of
first person pronouns used in the Self-Focus Sentence Completion Task; TAS, Toronto Alexithymia Scale; DIF, Difficulty Identifying Feelings
subscale of the TAS-20; DDF, Difficulty Describing Feelings subscale of the TAS-20; EOT, Externally Oriented Thinking subscale from the TAS-20;
ASC, autism spectrum condition; AgCC, agenesis of the corpus callosum.
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http://www.molecularautism.com/content/3/1/14domains, this patient with AgCC and ASC was atypical,
even with respect to the ASC comparison group, in that
deficits were more pronounced than what is typically
observed on average in ASC.
Within the SRE paradigm, the ASC comparison group
showed reduced memory sensitivity compared toTable 3 Additional self-referential measuresa
Control ASC AG
PSCS 30.50 (28.80 to 31.77) 29.80 (27.87 to 31.67) 24
SFA 0.11 (0.0987 to 0.1207) 0.09 (0.0817 to 0.1050) 0.11
TAS 41.97 (38.67 to 45.13) 58.37 (53.37 to 63.33) 70
DIF 13.50 (11.87 to 15.27) 20.03 (17.77 to 22.50) 24
DDF 11.10 (9.47 to 12.90) 16.87 (14.87 to 18.80) 20
EOT 17.37 (15.97 to 18.90) 21.47 (19.67 to 23.10) 26
aMean and 95% bootstrap bias-corrected and accelerated confidence intervals
(in parentheses) are given for the control and ASC groups. AG’s performance is
given in the third column. On each measure except for SFA, AG’s performance
was more extreme than the 95% confidence intervals for both control and
ASC groups. ASC, Autism Spectrum Conditions; PSCS, Private Self-
Consciousness Scale; SFA, implicit index of self-focused attention based on the
percentage of first-person pronouns used in the Self-Focus Sentence
Completion task; TAS, Toronto Alexithymia Scale; DIF, Difficulty Identifying
Feelings subscale of TAS-20; DDF, Difficulty Describing Feelings subscale of the
TAS-20; EOT, Externally Oriented Thinking subscale from the TAS-20.controls specifically in the Self and Friend conditions
[35]. In contrast, AG exhibited worse memory sensitivity
compared to both comparison groups across all condi-
tions. This pattern is partially suggestive of a general
memory deficit that occurs across all levels of proces-
sing, from very deep encoding during self-referential
processing to shallow encoding of information based on
linguistic characteristics (i.e. counting syllables). How-
ever, the biggest differences were observed in social-
cognitive conditions where memory was examined in
relation to other people (i.e. Friend and Potter). This
potentially suggests that while memory performance is
generally affected, the areas that are hit hardest are
social-cognitive information processing. Alternatively,
part of the general trend for reduced memory across all
conditions may be explained by AG’s lower IQ. VIQ was
positively correlated with memory sensitivity in the ASC
group for both Friend and Potter conditions. Given that
AG also had a diagnosis of ASC, it is reasonable to infer
from this result that a partial explanation for the
reduced memory in these conditions could be because
of lower IQ. However, it is also possible that IQ is not






















































Figure 5 Additional social-cognitive measures. This figure plots the bootstrap distributions of the mean along with the 95% bias-corrected
and accelerated bootstrap confidence intervals (vertical dotted lines). The ASC group is depicted in red and the control group in blue. AG is
depicted as the black dotted line. Abbreviations: IRI-EC, Empathic Concern subscale from the IRI; IRI-PT, Perspective Taking subscale of the IRI;
IRI-FS, Fantasy subscale of the IRI; IRI-PD, Personal Distress subscale of the IRI; EQ, Empathy Quotient; ECS, Emotional Contagion Scale; ASC, autism
spectrum condition; AgCC, agenesis of the corpus callosum.
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http://www.molecularautism.com/content/3/1/14Some variability in AG’s decreased performance is likely
to be due to true effects in the domains of self-
referential and social cognition. This is suggested by the
lack of correlations with IQ observed on other self-
referential and social-cognitive measures where AG also
shows more extreme scores.
We also evaluated whether AG reaps cognitive bene-
fits from self-referential information processing by com-
paring self-memory sensitivity to memory sensitivity
across non-self conditions. Here we computed the
difference-score between self-memory sensitivity and
non-self-memory sensitivity, and increasingly positive
scores indicate more benefit for self-referential informa-
tion processing. Since we are dealing with groups that
also have deficits in the social domain, using social-
cognitive conditions such as Friend and Potter as the
comparison to self-memory sensitivity is not ideal, be-
cause pronounced social-cognitive deficits can affect this
memory sensitivity difference-score. This can clearly be
seen in the difference-scores for Self-Friend and Self-
Potter. Here AG appears to benefit substantially from
self-referential information processing. However, this
interpretation should be avoided, as the effects aredriven primarily by the substantial drop-off in memory
sensitivity for the Friend and Potter conditions in AG.
Given these arguments, the most unambiguous measure
for assessing whether AG reaps cognitive benefits of
self-referential information processing is the Self-Syllable
difference-score. Here memory sensitivity in the Syllable
condition shows relatively less drop-off, and the
difference-score cannot be confounded by additional
deficits in social-cognitive processing. Here we find that
AG benefits less from self-referential processing, as
indexed by a lower Self-Syllable memory sensitivity
difference-score compared to the control group. AG
cannot be considered as an extreme from the ASC group
though, because this Self-Syllable memory sensitivity
difference-score was similar to what was observed in the
ASC group.
Similar patterns of more extreme scores from AG were
apparent in the self-referential domain on the PSCS,
TAS, and subscales of the TAS and in the social-
cognitive domain on the IRI-PT, IRI-FS, RMET, and EQ.
Of these measures, only RMET correlated with IQ, sug-
gesting that the extreme profile of scores from AG is










Figure 6 Reading the mind in the eyes test (RMET) performance. This figure plots the bootstrap distribution of the mean on the Reading the
Mind in the Eyes test (RMET) along with the 95% bias-corrected and accelerated bootstrap confidence intervals (vertical dotted lines). The ASC
group is depicted in red and the control group in blue. AG is depicted as the black dotted line. Abbreviations: RMET, Reading the Mind in the
Eyes test; ASC, autism spectrum condition; AgCC, agenesis of the corpus callosum.
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http://www.molecularautism.com/content/3/1/14may be that once IQ effects are accounted for, AG’s per-
formance may not necessarily be at the extreme of the
performance of the ASC group. In prior work, it is note-
worthy that, in a larger sample of individuals with
AgCC, there was overlap between the AgCC scores with
both the control and ASC distributions on the RMETTable 4 Additional social-cognitive measuresa
Control ASC AG
IRI-EC 18.93 (16.93 to 20.60) 15.83 (13.47 to 17.80) 18
IRI-PT 18.50 (16.50 to 20.23) 14.33 (12.27 to 16.13) 6
IRI-FS 17.77 (15.63 to 19.63) 13.87 (11.60 to 16.07) 8
IRI-PD 10.60 (9.03 to 11.87) 14.53 (12.67 to 16.50) 13
EQ 43.93 (41.97 to 50.17) 19.83 (16.63 to 23.33) 14
RMET 27.03 (25.70 to 28.43) 23.73 (20.97 to 25.73) 20
ECS 41.97 (39.10 to 44.73) 37.47 (34.57 to 40.30) 41
aMean and 95% bootstrap bias-corrected and accelerated confidence intervals
(in parentheses) are given for the control and ASC groups. AG’s performance is
given in the third column. On each measure except for ECS, IRI-EC, and IRI-PD,
AG’s performance was more extreme than the 95% confidence intervals for
both control and ASC groups. ASC, Autism Spectrum Condition; IRI-EC,
Empathic Concern subscale from the IRI; IRI-PT, Perspective Taking subscale of
the IRI; IRI-FS, Fantasy subscale of the IRI; IRI-PD, Personal Distress subscale of
the IRI; EQ, Empathy Quotient; RMET, Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test; ECS,
Emotion Contagion Scale.and no evidence of extreme deficits compared to the
ASC group was observed [25]. However, the overall con-
junction of extreme scores observed on both the SRE
paradigm and across various other self-referential and
social-cognitive measures suggests that AG’s perform-
ance represents an extreme with respect to what is
observed on average in ASC. Thus, rather than AG exhi-
biting performance typical of ASC without AgCC, the
current set of results is compatible with the idea that
additional abnormalities in the CC in ASC may be rele-
vant for understanding degree of self-referential and
social-cognitive difficulties in ASC. To this end, focusing
on cases with AgCC and a diagnosis of ASC may be a
good neuroanatomical model for parsing the critical role
that normative callosal development may have on these
domains.
It should also be noted where AG was not an extreme
with respect to the comparison groups. We found that
on IRI-EC, IRI-PD, and ECS that AG’s scores were more
similar to the control group. All of these measures share
one commonality in being affective in nature. This sug-
gests that the CC may not be as critical for understand-
ing aspects of empathy difficulties in ASC that are
affective in nature. This result stands in contrast to
Lombardo et al. Molecular Autism 2012, 3:14 Page 12 of 15
http://www.molecularautism.com/content/3/1/14subscales measuring more cognitive aspects of empathy
(i.e. perspective taking and fantasy subscales of the IRI),
where AG was more extreme than both comparison
groups. This may be suggestive that AgCC affects high-
level cognitive components of social cognition while
leaving affective components relatively spared. Within
the self-referential domain, AG was also similar to the
control group on the implicit measure of SFA that mea-
sures first person pronoun usage under conditions where
the participant is primed to use self-references. While
AG’s scores were significantly different from that
observed in the ASC comparison group, the directional-
ity is in keeping with a prior report showing that first
person pronoun usage in narratives was increased in
AgCC [46].
This apparent preservation of function in specific
domains may be suggestive of two possibilities. First,
there may be a certain degree of redundancy built into
the neural architecture for affective function and pro-
noun usage, such that lacking large parts of anterior cal-
losal regions do not have a major impact on these
domains. Second, the developmental nature of AgCC
might allow for appropriate compensatory mechanisms
to develop over time in these domains. Future research
could compare these results with that from patients who
have an acquired white matter lesion in the anterior cal-
losal region later in life. Finally, with respect to the self-
reported affective empathy measures that appear to be
spared, it remains to be seen whether AgCC patients
would show similar spared function in the domain of
affective empathy on performance-based tests. It may be
that affective empathy is affected in AgCC, but that
these patient’s self-referential difficulties obscure accur-
ate measurements of their own affective empathy
abilities.
There are several caveats and limitations to highlight
about the current study. First, analyses showed that on
some measures, variation related to IQ may be import-
ant. Given that our case (AG) had IQ scores that were
lower than both comparison groups, it remains to be
seen how well the results here are generalizable in stud-
ies where AgCC and comparison groups are matched on
IQ. Our suggestion is that the role of IQ may be limited
for interpreting the results here, as we found many
pieces of evidence where AG’s performance was more
extreme than the comparison groups and IQ was not
generally correlated with performance. Second, this case
report may not be fully generalizable to all patients with
concurrent AgCC and ASC. It will be important for fu-
ture work to expand on these observations with larger
prospective work. Third, the current results are
restricted to self-report measures and constrained ex-
perimental tasks involving situations likely not present
during everyday functioning and real-world scenarios.Therefore, it remains to be seen whether the inferences
from this study would bear out in future work using
more naturalistic measures in real-world social situa-
tions. Fourth, the current work assesses the question
about corpus callosum variation and autism from a cat-
egorical point of view. For example, in this study groups
are defined categorically by their clinical diagnosis and
within autism, the patient stands out as categorically dis-
tinct at the level of the corpus callosum. This is not the
only way to investigate this question. Another way to ad-
dress these types of questions is to look at the
phenomenon from a continuous perspective where both
autism and the corpus callosum are measured on a
spectrum. This approach is intriguing and should be fol-
lowed up in future work. This work sets up the hypoth-
esis that from a dimensional perspective, better
performance in areas of self-referential and social cogni-
tion might be related to continuous variation in CC size.
Finally, it is important to note the nature of AG’s cal-
losal development. Rather than lacking a CC altogether,
AG did have intact connections within the posterior sec-
tion of the CC. At present there is no clear indication of
whether partial versus complete AgCC cases are differ-
ent with respect to performance in self-referential and
social-cognitive domains. A recent MEG study found no
differences between partial and complete AgCC with re-
spect to global connectivity across alpha, gamma and
beta bands [100]. Another recent study of fMRI resting
state connectivity found strikingly similarities between
AgCC and those with an intact CC. The exceptions to
this were reduced connectivity in the posterior midline
areas typically connected via the posterior sections of
the CC [101]. Thus, because it has been postulated that
these posterior midline areas may be important for self-
referential and social-cognitive development [102], it is
possible that AG’s partial connections make him a less
extreme case than would be seen in complete AgCC.
However, this remains open for future research on the
topic.Conclusions
In conclusion, we report that a case of partial AgCC and
ASC showed more extreme scores than those typically
found on measures that elicit group-differences in self-
referential and social cognition in ASC compared to
neurotypical controls. These results confirm prior find-
ings suggesting that individuals with AgCC have marked
problems in these domains. Furthermore, the current
work suggests potential in viewing AgCC as a neuroana-
tomical model associated with ASC that may allow us to
gain further insight into the mechanisms that may be
important for understanding difficulties in self-
referential and social cognition.
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